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At the sitting of 11 December 1989 the President of the European Parliament 
announced that he had forwarded the motion for a resolution by Mr Robles Piquer 
on the urgent need for a genuine Community foreign policy, pursuant to Rule 63 
of the Rules of Procedure, to the Political Affairs Committee as the committee 
responsible and to the Committee on Institutional Affairs for its opinion. 
At its meeting of 31 January 1990 the Political Affairs Committee decided to 
draw up a report. 
At its meeting of 26 April 1990 it appointed Mr Verde i Aldea rapporteur. 
At its meetings of 14 October 1991, 19 May 1992, and 15 October 1992 the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security considered the draft report. 
At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution unanimously. 
The following were present for the vote: Baron Crespo, chairman; Cassanmagnago 
Cerretti, first vice-chairman; Verde i Aldea, rapporteur; Aglietta, Balfe, 
Bertens, Canavarro, Chiabrando (for Bonetti pursuant to Rule 111(2)), Colajanni 
(for Castellina), Fernandez-Albor, Ford (for Newens), Gaibisso, Holzfuss, 
Jepsen, Langer, Llorca Vilaplana, Magnani Noya, Onesta, Pucci (for Gawronski), 
van Putten (for Woltjer), Robles Piquer (for Habsburg), Sakellariou, Scott-
Hopkins (for McMillan-Scott pursuant to Rule 111(2)), and Trivelli. 
The opinion of the Committee on Institutional Affairs is attached to this 
report. 
The report was tabled on 22 October 1992. 
The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the 
part-session at which the report is to be considered. 
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A 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on shaping the European Community's common foreign policy 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr Robles Piquer on the urgent 
need for a genuine Community foreign policy (B3-0387/89), 
- having regard to its resolution of 7 April 1992 on the outcome of the 
1 Intergovernmental Conferences , 
- having regard to the conclusions of the European Council in Lisbon, 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security 
and the opinion of the Committee on Institutional Affairs (A3-0322/92), 
A. whereas, with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, it was decided to create 
a Union whose objectives are considerably more ambitious than those of the 
Community, 
B. whereas one of the main features of the Union is the definition and 
implementation of a common foreign policy designed to place greater emphasis 
on its international dimension and make its presence felt internationally 
not just in the trade and economic sectors but also in other spheres and 
outside the Community's frontiers in sectors beyond the commercial and 
economic spheres, 
c. whereas the current international context requires united efforts by the 
Member States, particularly in international organizations such as the UN 
and the CSCE, the definition of common strategies and actions and a greater 
role in maintaining peace and international security in accordance with the 
objectives of the United Nations Charter, 
D. whereas the definition and implementation of a common foreign policy would 
be an important factor in giving momentum to and developing the Union, 
E. welcoming the introduction of Union citizenshlp, the corollary to which as 
far as international relations are concerned is diplomatic protection, one 
of the consequences of which is to ensure diplomatic protection by the whole 
Union and not just by the diplomatic and consular services of one of the 
Member States, 
F. whereas, however, the foreign policy prov1s1ons agreed at Maastricht will 
not help to improve the democratic deficit which is ultimately to the 
detriment of the citizens of the Member States, 
1 OJ No. C 125, 18.5.1992, p. 81 
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G. whereas the Maastricht Treaty prov1s1ons on the CFSP must be applied in 
strict compliance and coordination with the existing mechanisms for dealing 
with the external aspects of the Community's spheres of responsibility (for 
example, agricultural, competition, scientific and technological research, 
economic and social cohesion and environmental policy, etc.), 
H. convinced that the CFSP must be based on the principles of the United 
Nations and the CSCE and be designed to promote, internationally, policies 
for disarmament and the peaceful settlement of conflicts, 
I. expressing its criticism of the provisions of Article 228a (new) of the EC 
Treaty which enables the Council to take measures to interrupt economic 
relations with one or more third countries without having to seek 
Parliament's opinion, 
J. having regard to the need for greater clarity in relations between COREPER 
and the political Committee in order to establish clearly the respective 
spheres of responsibility of those bodies, 
K. concerned at the fact that, within the Union, the Commission does not have 
powers of external representation equal to those of the Presidency, whereas, 
under the Treaty of Rome, such powers were mainly conferred on the 
Commission, 
L. deploring the fact that the Maastricht Treaty has not sufficiently clarified 
relations between the various Community institutions as regards the external 
representation of the Union, 
M. recalling that most of the representations successively set up by the 
Commission, often with Parliament's encouragement, have concentrated their 
efforts on administering the development cooperation provided by the 
Community and hence have been set up almost exclusively in capitals of the 
Member States of the Lome Conventions or in Latin American, Asian or 
Mediterranean countries, 
N. whereas the Council must clearly define, as soon as possible and in 
accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 of the 
Maastricht Treaty, the general principles for the adoption of common action 
on the basis of criteria which are in the interests of Member States' 
citizens, 
0. whereas the criteria for common action as defined in Lisbon should be 
forwarded to Parliament for its opinion, 
P. whereas majority voting on foreign policy matters defined by the Council as 
concerning the Union is essential if the overall strategy of such policy is 
to be effective, 
Q. whereas the creation of common embassies representing either or all the 
Member States of the Union or some of them could help to affirm the 
international identity of the Union and would be in accordance with its 
interests, 
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R. determined to play an active role in clarifying and improving the definition 
and implementation of the procedures agreed on in respect of foreign policy, 
bearing in mind the ultimate objective of a federal-type Union, 
General comments 
1. Considers that the objectives of a common foreign policy as set out in 
Article J.1 of the Maastricht Treaty are in line with the interests of the 
peoples of the Union; 
2. Believes that the current allocation of foreign policy responsibilities 
between the institutions of the Union may be accepted only in so far as the 
present phase can be considered as a transitional period leading ultimately 
to the full democratization of the process of defining and implementing the 
common foreign policy; 
3. Considers that, in the current phase, there should be a clearer definition 
of the roles of each institution in order to clarify the substance of the 
Maastricht Agreement and enable Parliament to exercise effective and 
democratic control over the activities of the Council and the Commission in 
the field of foreign policy through all the instruments available to it; 
4. Requests that steps be taken without delay to review fearlessly and 
radically the question of the presence of the Community Member States in the 
United Nations, particularly in the Security Council, in order to ensure 
that they are really represented jointly in accordance with the spirit of 
the European Union, and that this coincides with decisive Community action 
to promote a more comprehensive reform of the United Nations, to make it 
more democratic, representative and effective; 
in respect of the Council 
5. Calls on the Council to give an undertaking to consult Parliament regularly 
in advance of all its foreign policy measures and to take account of its 
opinion; 
6. Calls for special channels to be set up enabling the necessary information 
and documents to be forwarded rapidly to Parliament to ensure that such 
consultation is both effective and useful; 
7. Stresses that the current division of responsibilities between COREPER and 
the political Committee constitutes an element of uncertainty which is 
detrimental to the transparency required in relations between the Council 
and Parliament; 
8. Calls on the Council to consult Parliament, should it have to decide whether 
to interrupt trade relations on the basis of Article 228a, before any 
decisions are taken and, where this is not possible owing to justifiable 
reasons of urgency, to consult Parliament immediately afterwards and modify 
its position to take account of Parliament's opinions; 
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9. Deplores the fact that instead of a genuine common foreign and security 
policy, it was decided in the Maastricht Treaty to assign a large share 
of responsibility for security policy to a parallel organization, such as 
the WEU, which does not include all the Member States, is not under the 
democratic control of the EP and is furthermore still an intergovernmental 
institution largely outside the control of the Community authorities; 
10. Considers that the Council must give an undertaking to take part regularly 
in the meetings of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security and 
attend question time within the committee since it is mainly in this way 
that the continuity of Parliament's supervision can be guaranteed; 
11. Calls on the Presidency to submit its foreign policy programme at the 
beginning of each six-monthly term of office and to take account in the 
implementation of that programme of the opinion expressed by Parliament; 
12. Calls on the Presidency to maintain the Commission's role in the external 
representation of the Union in order not to weaken its position with 
respect to the Treaty of Rome; 
13. Urges the Council, in view of the new developments and the tasks envisaged 
in the Maastricht Treaty, to make provision for the inclusion of EP 
delegations in the Community delegation to UN, CSCE and other conferences; 
14. Considers that the basic criteria for justifying the adoption of common 
measures are crucial factors in shaping the foreign policy of the Union 
and that Parliament should therefore be consulted before such criteria are 
finally adopted and whenever it is necessary to modify those criteria as 
required by the international situation; 
15. Calls on the Council to forward to Parliament, for its op1n1on, the 
Foreign Ministers' report on the probable development of the CFSP, annexed 
to the conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, and to amend it on the 
basis of the comments made by Parliament; 
16. Calls on the Council to open common embassies for the Member States when 
this seems appropriate, especially in countries where they are not now 
represented or where their interests are most easily combined; 
17. Hopes that the new embassies will use the services of the officials 
employed in the diplomatic services of the Member States, so that they may 
acquire the habit of defending the views and interests of the Union and 
not only of the Member States; 
18. Draws the Council's attention to the importance of the recommendation 
contained in Article J.7 of the Maastricht Treaty in so far as this means 
that any action undertaken by the Council may be deemed legitimate or 
otherwise by Parliament; 
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in respect of the Commission 
19. Calls on the Commission to submit its foreign policy guidelines to the 
Parliament before they are forwarded to the Council and to deliver at the 
same time an assessment of the financial implications of such proposals; 
20. Considers that the Commission must ensure that any information at its 
disposal on foreign policy matters and information which it receives from 
its representatives and delegations outside the Union is forwarded to 
Parliament in an appropriate form, and that it takes account of 
Parliament's opinion; 
21. Considers that Parliament should be informed of the appointments of Union 
ambassadors and Commission delegates when they have been made and that 
Parliament's committees should be informed thereof if they so request; 
calls on the Commission to take steps to establish, together with 
Parliament, the appropriate procedure for this purpose; 
22. Considers that at present the EP does not have the powers and instruments 
it needs to play an adequate role in a common foreign and security policy 
and therefore requests that the relevant powers be broadened; 
in respect of Parliament 
23. Considers that Parliament must make maximum use of the instruments at its 
disposal under the Maastricht Treaty; 
24. Notes that according to the conclusions of the European Council in Lisbon 
questions with implications for defence, within the meaning of Article J. 4 
of the Maastricht Treaty, are not subject to the process involved in 
common action, but reaffirms its right to be consulted in order to ensure 
democratic control over this important sphere of action of the governments 
of the Member States; 
25. Believes that, given the specific nature of foreign policy, provision must 
be made for special procedures to guarantee the confidentiality of 
proceedings, otherwise the Union's activities in this sector will be 
seriously undermined; 
26. Stresses the importance of the financial side of foreign policy 
activities; reserves the right to take action under the budgetary 
procedure to ensure that due account is taken of its opinions; 
27. Considers that, in the event of a serious, prolonged dispute with the 
Council and/or the Commission on foreign policy issues, it must resort to 
a motion of censure on the Commission, this being the only effective means 
of pressure at its disposal when supervising the executive and the Member 
States which appointed it; 
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28. Calls on its Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of 
Credentials and Immunities to define the procedures for implementing the 
instruments mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty, such as the consultation 
and recommendation processes, and to draw up the necessary rules for 
permanent dialogue with the Council and the Commission on foreign policy 
issues; 
29. Considers, by extension, that the same type of measures should be adopted 
in respect of security matters, since it is necessary to establish with 
the other institutions concerned, particularly the WEU Council, a system 
of rules compatible with the efficient performance of the duties of 
representation and democratic control assigned to the European Parliament; 
0 
0 0 
30. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the 
Council, European Political Cooperation, the governments of the Member 
States, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the CSCE and the WEU 
Council. 
DOC_EN\RR\215\215776 
- 9 - PE 201.471/fin. 
B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
1. International dimension of the Community 
Allied to its essentially economic and commercial character, the Community has 
always had a clear international vocation. 
It substitutes the Member States on the international stage in all the areas of 
policy which fall within the Community competence (trade, agriculture, 
fisheries, etc.). 
It is natural that with the Maastricht agreements, the Community's international 
dimension has become even more important, even though the outcome of the 
Conference on Political Union did not come up to the European Parliament's 
expectations. 
2. European Political Cooperation as the embodiment of an international 
presence which goes beyond the economy and trade 
The EEC Treaty did not confer powers on the Community in the field of foreign 
and security policy. 
Nevertheless, as early as 1970, EC ministers considered and approved the 
Davignon report which, inter alia, laid the foundations for Community 
cooperation in the field of international affairs. 
This was the origin of European Political Cooperation, which aimed to promote 
the harmonization of standpoints, the shaping of attitudes and, where possible, 
joint action in the sphere of foreign policy. This instrument comprised two 
meetings of Foreign Ministers each year and four meetings each year of the 
Political Committee composed of senior officials of the Foreign Ministries. 
The Single European Act institutionalized EPC, Title III of the Act being 
devoted to Treaty provisions on European Cooperation in the sphere of foreign 
policy. It stipulates that members 'shall endeavour jointly to formulate and 
implement a European foreign policy' (Article 30( 1)), and it further states that 
'closer cooperation on questions of European security would contribute in an 
essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy 
matters' (Article 30(6)(a)). 
EPC nevertheless remains anchored in the sphere of intergovernmental rather than 
Community cooperation. Moreover, unanimity generally makes it impossible to go 
beyond issuing declarations, which are not followed by action. 
3. Inadequacy of EPC in the face of new international challenges 
In 1989 and 1990 the Community - which was going through a phase marked by 
strengthening of its institutions and euphoria at the completion of the Internal 
Market - was faced with international events on a scale which went far beyond 
the Community's ability to respond. 
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The radical changes in Central and Eastern Europe demonstrated the inadequacy 
of EPC, even though they came about largely without the involvement of the 
Community and without being anticipated. Nevertheless, as the Strasbourg 
European Council stressed, the Community must provide the basis for future 
stability in Europe. 
The extremely limited impact of the Community and Europe in general was 
highlighted at every stage of the Gulf crisis, an event heralded as nothing less 
than the starting point for a new world order, which was also affected by the 
profound changes in Central and Eastern Europe. 
It therefore seems logical to endeavour to move towards a Community which 
incorporates both economic aspects and political aspects relating to foreign 
policy - with a view to transforming it into a common policy in the widest 
possible sense - and security. 
4. The new dimension of a common foreign policy 
The decision of the Dublin European Council to convene the Intergovernmental 
Conference on Political Union gave rise to the idea - made a necessity by the 
international events referred to above of extending the Community's 
competencies to foreign policy. 
In the Martin report, adopted on 22 November 1990, the European Parliament lists 
the following as suitable Community activities in the field of foreign and 
security policy: those connected with the maintenance of peace and security, 
the peaceful settlement of disputes within the framework of international law, 
the reduction of armaments and the strengthening of social harmony based on 
respect for human rights. Parliament has basically continued to move in this 
direction, drawing consequences from the proposals put forward in the above 
report. 
The Rome European Council of December 1990 pointed to 'the broad agreement on 
basic principles concerning the vocation of the Union to deal with aspects of 
foreign and security policy, in accordance with a sustained evolutive process 
and in a unitary manner on the basis of general objectives laid down in the 
Treaty'. 
5. The general objectives of a common foreign policy 
The Rome European Council itself proposed the general objectives which should 
be formulated in the Treaty; these objectives are acceptable but evidently 
insufficient. 
The Council considers that the general objectives should be: 
maintaining peace and international stability; 
developing friendly relations with all countries; 
promoting democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights; 
and as an instrument for achieving these objectives, 
encouraging the economic development of all nations, also bearing in mind 
the special relations of individual Member States. 
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It is clear that the list of objectives can and needs to be expanded by making 
some of the objectives formulated in an excessively general way more specific 
and by including previous statements by the Community institutions and the 
Council itself. In this sense, it seems logical that the objectives should also 
include: 
disarmament and arms control, as well as economic and technological 
cooperation in this field and with regard to arms experts; 
community of action in international organizations, particularly the 
United Nations and the CSCE. 
This field of competence should gradually be expanded with a view to 
incorporating new objectives where Community integration so allows and the 
international situation so requires. 
6. Principal fields of action for the objectives of a common foreign policy 
There is no doubt that, as the Council's declarations, Parliament's resolutions 
and the Commission's proposals show, international organizations represent a 
priority element in a Community foreign policy and common external relations. 
Given that the first CSCE meeting in Helsinki in 1975 was the first 
international forum at which the Community spoke with one voice, it is logical 
to conclude that the CSCE, particularly following the Paris Charter, might 
provide the main nucleus to implement the objectives of active participation in 
the new structure of peace and security in Europe, as Parliament recommended in 
the Romeos report ( ... ). 
Nevertheless, Europe is calling on the Community to take up clear positions on 
other questions over and above the problems of cooperation and security 
addressed by the CSCE: in relation to EFTA and questions involving the European 
Economic Area and the integration already requested by some of its members, and 
also the complex network of political steps which were awaited both by the 
former Soviet Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The new 
generation of agreements with these countries, whose economic dimension is 
already almost outweighed by the political dimension, require a political 
response from the Community which overcomes the earlier sharing of influence 
among Western countries which are now Community Member States. 
The United Nations, which has gained fresh importance following the end of the 
Cold War with its corresponding bipolarity, and in the wake of the tendency 
towards American hegemony arising from the Gulf War, needs to find a new profile 
and play an important part in what is emerging as a new world order. 
In the light of the above, the European Community, which is a basic and actively 
effective element should create a structure of peace and cooperation in the 
Mediterranean, particularly in its Western sector, where mutual links are of 
vital importance. 
Finally the Community should continue to work unitedly within GATT, a forum 
which has a marked impact on the economic and trade dimension of international 
life. 
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7. The common foreign and security oolicy after Maastricht 
In the context of the various systems added, modified or confirmed in the 
Maastricht agreement, the common foreign and security policy and the policy on 
justice and home affairs are, as far as procedures and approach are concerned, 
the same kind of institutional, decision-making and operational structure. The 
main features making up this structure are as follows: 
(a) Each of these two policies comprises a Community section and - which is 
more important - an intergovernmental cooperation section. 
- The Community has responsibilities in foreign policy (commercial 
policy, development, etc.) 
The common foreign and security policy, administered by the new 
structure deriving from EPC, may extend to all spheres. 
(b) Action in the two spheres is twofold: 
- exclusively intergovernmental cooperation; thus common positions; the 
obligation for the Member States to abide by them; implementation by 
the Member States and, within its field of competence, by the 
Community. The matters dealt with in this way are still the 
responsibility of each State; 
- joint measures: hence setting of joint objectives; the obligation for 
the Member States to abide by them; implementation by the Member 
States or the Community or by specific administrative structures such 
as Europol or departments of the WEU. In principle the matters dealt 
with in this way are no longer the responsibility of the individual 
States. 
(c) Decisions in these two fields are prepared by committees of high-level 
national officials, who do not belong to COREPER. 
(d) The European Council plays a general guiding role in decision-making 
process for the common foreign and security policy. 
(i) as regards exclusively intergovernmental cooperation, the principle 
is concertation and consul tat ion within the Council. The latter may 
draw up common positions. The behaviour of the Union and its Member 
States in international organizations are also dealt with in this 
context; 
(ii) as regards common measures, the Council decides unanimously whether 
a matter is to be the subject of joint action and determines its 
scope, objectives, etc. In the field of justice and home affairs 
there is specific reference to the principle of subsidiarity. The 
Council may decide that implementation is to be achieved by a 
qualified majority; 
(iii) the Commission is to be fully involved and has a non-exclusive right 
of initiative, except for police and customs cooperation; 
(iv) the European Parliament must be consulted on the main aspects of the 
two policies, is regularly informed and may put questions to the 
Council; 
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(v) the Court of Justice has no role (except, probably, in defining the 
limits of Community competence; 
(vi) by decision of the Council, expenditure in the field of common 
foreign and security policy may be financed by the Community budget 
(in which case the Parliament can play its role) or by national 
contributions, possibly shared out according to a specific formula. 
(e) The annex to the Treaty contains the following as far as the common foreign 
and security policy is concerned: a list of the fields covered by common 
action from the beginning (CSCE, disarmament and arms control, non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons and the economic aspects of security); 
a kind of agreement with the WEU, which strengthens its military structure, 
envisages its absorption into the Union and raises the issue of cooperation 
between Parliament and the WEU Assembly; an invitation to all the Member 
States to join the WEU. 
(f) As regards the EEC Treaty, it should be noted that an amendment to 
Article 228 empowers Parliament to give its assent (by a simple 
majority) on international treaties which are already (Article 238) 
subject to assent, cooperation treaties (containing special 
institutional provisions) and treaties having important budgetary 
implications and entailing amendments to decisions taken under the 
codecision procedure. 
8. Consulate services for European citizens 
The Union also accepts the concept and reality of European citizenship, without 
which the construction of the Community would lack its most important human 
dimension. It is extremely difficult to envisage a Europe for everyone without 
European citizens. 
European citizens represent a new development which needs to be recognized and 
protected not only within Community territory but throughout the world. 
Diplomatic and consular services in particular must cast off the rigidity by 
which they are strictly linked to one of the Member States and are exclusively 
concerned with nationals of that State. 
Effective and flexible formulae need to be found to allow such services to be 
provided outside the Community to all Community citizens, irrespective of 
nationality. 
The Maastricht Treaty provides a response to this need by creating the concept 
of Union citizenship, which is accompanied by obligations regarding diplomatic 
and consular protection. 
With a view to achieving this objective, a study should be undertaken as soon 
as possible proposing measures to enable the civil service outside the Member 
States to find ways of integrating at Community level the services intended for 
European citizens. 
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9. AsSessment of results and future prospects 
The whole debate at the Intergovernmental Conference hinged on the question 
whether or not to go beyond political cooperation as we now know it. For this 
reason, the best way to assess the results of the Intergovernmental Conference 
is to compare the Maastricht Treaty with the text of Title III of the Single 
Act. 
As regards foreign policy proper - leaving aside security policy for the moment 
- progress has been very slight. Admittedly the ultimate objective has been 
formulated in more ambitious terms - a common foreign and security policy 
undoubtedly goes farther than the European foreign policy referred to in the 
Single Act, but it is all mere rhetoric unless there are actual commitments and 
procedures. 
The commitments made in the Maastricht Treaty are broadly speaking the same as 
in the Single Act, although they are formulated in a more definite way (compare 
Article J.2(2) and J.3(4) of the Maastricht Treaty with Article 30(2) of the 
Single Act). The procedures are also based largely on the Single Act, but with 
the addition of joint action (Article J. ). However, Article 30 of the Single 
Act already talked about the execution of joint action. 
It should be noted that Article J.3(2) mentions the possibility of qualified 
majority voting on the implementation of joint action. This provision is of 
symbolic importance, but the difficulties inherent in the proposed procedure and 
the interminable debates it gave rise to during the Conference raise doubts as 
to whether it will actually be used. The inevitable conclusion seems to be that 
little progress has been made in this sphere and the advocates of the status quo 
in the field of foreign policy have largely prevailed. One might ask whether 
this is an adequate basis for Europe to assert its identity on the international 
scene, in particular in implementing a common foreign policy, as stated in 
Article B of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Before examining the subject more closely we should establish some basic points: 
on the one hand the Union is given responsibility for foreign and security 
policy, whilst on the other the democratic deficit seems to be accentuated in 
this area. As an example, we could quote the new Article 228a of the EEC 
Treaty, according to which the Council may decide to interrupt in part or 
completely economic relations with a third country without having to consult the 
European Parliament. 
Furthermore, the creation of a common foreign policy with mechanisms and 
procedures of its own must not under any circumstances undermine the 
Commission's powers in the implementation of the external aspects of Community 
policies. 
1 0. The role of the institutions 
However the Community develops, the role of each of the institutions in the 
implementation of the common foreign and security policy must be defined. In 
this as in the other common policies, the principle of the separation of powers 
is not applied fully. 
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In the individual States foreign policy is traditionally the exclusive 
competence of governments. This is because of the very nature of the policy, 
the legislative nature of which is fairly limited. Parliaments can monitor 
government action in the field of foreign policy using the usual instruments-
questions, motions of no-confidence, the adoption or rejection of international 
treaties, and by means of ratification procedures. However, the often 
confidential and secret nature of foreign policy limits the traditional 
activities of parliaments. 
Under the Community system the chief legislative body, the Council, is also 
given the role of originating and managing foreign policy whilst the executive, 
the Commission, is only given a right of initiative. Parliament's role is even 
more marginal since it has limited powers to propose legislation (by means 
recommendations) and is not able to sanction the activities of the Council. 
The development of the European enterprise should ultimately lead to the 
creation of two-chamber system consisting of Parliament and the Council, in 
which the executive, the Commission, will be responsible for administering 
foreign policy and will be subject to parliamentary control, including censure. 
The Maastricht system will operate in the short and medium term and hence, quite 
apart from institutional considerations, the question arises what organizational 
procedures will ensure the effective operation of the system. 
It is not Parliament's role to implement foreign policy, although it must have 
the powers needed to influence the Council, monitor its activities and ensure 
that these activities are in the interests of the peoples of the Union. 
In view of this the Commission and the Council should ensure that a constant 
flow of information reaches Parliament. The Commission should also undertake 
to submit to Parliament the names of its delegates and representatives outside 
the Community. It is up to Parliament to exploit the budgetary procedure as an 
instrument for exerting control and influence in order to ensure that its 
opinions are taken into account. Finally, the creation of a genuine common 
foreign policy would be helped by the creation of joint embassies wherever 
possible. 
11. Interinstitutional mechanisms 
The Treaty on European Union confers the main powers in the field of foreign and 
security policy in the Council. It is for the Eur:opean Council to decide that 
a matter may be the subject of joint action and the presidency is responsible 
for carrying out such action. Once the European Council has established the 
principles and general guidelines, the Council implements its decisions. 
Decisions are taken unanimously, except in cases where it has been (unanimously) 
decided to vote by a majority. 
The Commission is involved in foreign and security policy and has a right of 
initiative. The Court of Justice is completely excluded from the system. 
Parliament is consulted about the main aspects of the policy and fundamental 
decisions concerning it. It has the right to put questions or submit 
recommendations to the Council. Finally, it holds an annual debate on 
developments in foreign and security policy. 
DOC_EN\RR\215\215776 - 16 - PE 201.471/fin. 
As Parliament has advocated on several occasions2 , the Council should accept 
the obligation to consult Parliament beforehand and regularly on foreign policy 
decisions. 
This means that proposals for decisions and joint action on foreign and security 
policy should be promptly forwarded to Parliament, even unofficially in certain 
cases, so as to enable the relevant parliamentary bodies to state their views. 
Special channels must therefore be set up for the forwarding of information from 
the Council to Parliament. Parliament should have access not only to the 
decisions which the Council intends to adopt, but also to all the necessary 
information. The cases in which the Council adopts joint action without 
requesting the prior opinion of Parliament must be restricted to a minimum and 
in any case the Council should consult Parliament as soon as possible. 3 
In order to make the Council's activities clearer and more transparent, the 
respective competences of COREPER and the political committee must be defined. 
Parliament must have specific and responsible interlocutors and no longer 
tolerate the existence of grey areas in the administration of foreign and 
security policy. 
The 'non-legislative' and confidential nature of foreign policy is not conducive 
to the traditional forms of consultation. Whilst it is perfectly feasible for 
the general guidelines of the policy - such as the half-yearly work programme 
or the presidency's report - to be presented in plenary, it seems difficult to 
apply these procedures fro individual measures or declarations. Parliament 
would not be able to deliver its opinion with the necessary promptness and would 
not be able to ensure the degree of confidentiality that the Council might wish. 
In fact, often the international situation leads the Member States to take up 
positions at short notice which do not fit in with the breaks in parliamentary 
sessions and the separation between the various places of work. 
Consequently a fast channel must be set up via the competent parliamentary 
bodies, in particular the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, to act as 
the Council's special interlocutor. 
The following procedures could be established: proposals for decisions to be 
forwarded immediately to Parliament via the Committee on Foreign Affairs; in 
urgent cases Council representatives and the committee bureau could meet, for 
example at the end of certain Councils in which foreign policy measures are on 
the agenda; in addition, the Council presidency (or even representatives of the 
Troika, to make the system more flexible) should attend committee meetings at 
least once a month; there should also be a 'question time' in committee on 
subjects agreed on beforehand with the Council presidency. Finally, in cases 
of relative urgency, the committee could hold extraordinary meetings not 
included in the usual calendar of meetings. 
2 
3 
Cf. Mrs Cassanmagnago Cerretti's op1n1on on the outcome of the 
Intergovernmental Conferences (Doe. A3-0123/92, Part II). 
In order to make the forwarding of documents easier, a telematic network 
should be set up linking the two institutions in real time and enabling 
documents to be transmitted through data processing circuits. This would 
speed up the whole procedure. 
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The above proposals apply mutatis mutandis to relations between the Commission 
and Parliament. The Commission also should undertake to inform the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs as a matter of priority about foreign policy proposals which 
it intends to put forward, accompanying such proposals with an assessment of the 
budgetary implications of the proposals. 
Furthermore, the Commission should ensure that it forwards to Parliament 
relevant information it receives from its delegations of the offices 
representing it. The necessary steps to ensure confidentiality should of course 
be taken. This would allow Parliament to monitor the activity of offices abroad 
and obtain information on the preventive diplomatic measures that the Community 
intends to adopt. 
As far as relations between the Commission and the Council are concerned, the 
presidency should preserve the role of the Commission as representative of the 
Community and the Union in international relations. 
1 2. The recommendation procedure 
The Maastricht agreement provides for a specific procedure in addition to the 
consultation procedure - the power to make recommendations. The recommendation 
is a political rather than legal instrument; it is not legally binding but is 
a political act addressed primarily to the Council, and its value is enhanced 
if specific majorities are required for its adoption (e.g. an absolute majority 
of Members). It is up to Parliament to exploit to the full this opportunity 
offered by the Maastricht Treaty. The power to issue recommendations on foreign 
policy may once again be transferred to the relevant committee if time is 
particularly short. The committee is a specialized forum for the discussion of 
foreign policy, especially in so far as it maintains continuous links with the 
Council presidency and with the Commission. To assign this power to the 
committee, subject to possible referral back to plenary, in accordance with 
procedures and forms to be agreed on, would also help to prevent increasing the 
burden on plenary sittings. Recommendations are to be addressed to the 
Commission and/or the Council and also be sent for information to the other 
institutions. They should outline the background to the issue in question and 
indicate succinctly (in two or three paragraphs) what kind of action Parliament 
considers the Council should opt for. The recommendation achieves two aims: to 
ask the Council to adopt a specific approach and to confer legitimacy on its 
action. 
Judicious use of this instrument would enhance the powers at Parliament's 
disposal. In fact, it is difficult to imagine that the Council would wish to 
deviate systematically from Parliament's position. It is more likely that, as 
at present in the cooperation procedure, there it would tend to accept - at 
least in part - the suggestions put forward by Parliament. 
13. The motion of no-confidence 
The question then arises as to how Parliament can exercise control over the work 
of the Council and to a lesser extent, over that of the Commission. When joint 
action is adopted, Parliament must be able to approve or reject what the Council 
decides. This is what generally happens in a normal institutional relationship, 
in which the parliamentary body approves or rejects the government's policy. 
Although under the Community system the European Parliament cannot censure what 
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Council does, it is in the latter's interest to ensure that Parliament agrees 
with its policy. 
Parliamentary control will be carried out once a year in the debate on 
developments in foreign policy provided for in the Treaty on European Union, but 
also in individual cases, depending on the importance of the subject under 
discussion. Effective use of this 'discharge' instrument in the sphere of 
foreign policy would make the Council extremely receptive to Parliament's 
op1n1on. There would be substantial negative repercussions if Parliament did 
not approve of the Council's approach on particularly serious matters and this 
danger would induce the Council to try to obtain parliament's prior approval in 
order not to find itself in conflict with it at a later stage. 
Another effective instrument for control is the motion of no-confidence or 
censure against the Commission. In the relationship between the Community 
institutions Parliament should not hesitate to use this instrument, not only 
when the Commission is the direct target, but also and above all when the 
intention is to affect the Council. It is an imperfect and indirect 
institutional instrument, but Parliament should nevertheless have recourse to 
it in cases where there is a particularly serious clash with the Council on 
foreign policy. In the absence of other powers such as the possibility of 
blocking the execution of joint action or the adoption of a common position, the 
only instrument it has at its disposal is to censure the Commission, which will 
ultimately damage the Council and the Member States which, in the final 
analysis, appointed it. On the other hand, Parliament's strategy should make 
the Commission endeavour to submit to Parliament beforehand the initiatives 
which it intends to submit to the Council, and to withdraw such proposals when 
they do not meet with Parliament's approval. Obviously, persistent refusal on 
the part of the Commission to comply with Parliament's opinion should lead to 
the tabling and adoption of a motion of censure. 
14. Specific aspects of security 
Most of the observations made above should also apply, by analogy, to security 
policy. As a result of the Maastricht Treaty, the WEU has become part of the 
Union and is responsible for security matters. Parliamentary control over the 
activities of the WEU Council must be carried out by Parliament, the only 
democratically elected body. This means that to all intents and purposes the 
European Parliament must replace the WEU Parliamentary Assembly which consists 
of members who, according to the statutes, must be members of the national 
parliaments and of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. In view 
of this the European Parliament should enjoy the same rights of initiative and 
control that it has vis-a-vis the Council and the Commission - questions, 
recommendations, etc. 
It is therefore essential that the WEU Council should formally commit itself to 
answering questions, presenting its activities during plenary or in committee -
in other words to applying the procedures governing the foreign policy sphere. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure 
by Mr ROBLES PIQUER 
on the urgent need for a genuine Community foreign policy 
(B3-0387/89) 
The European Parliament, 
A. whereas the European Community's lack of unity means that its economic 
strength is not matched by a corresponding political strength, 
B. whereas European Political Cooperation as it presently stands constitutes 
an encouraging but inadequate response to the need for a unified foreign 
policy, 
c. whereas this situation continues to give rise to what the Italian Professor 
Carlo Pelanda of Georgia (USA) has called 'too many Europes' in an article 
which underlines the Community's lack of a unified foreign policy, 
instancing areas such as the crises of the Soviet system, Lebanon and 
underdevelopment in the Third World, 
D. whereas a unified foreign policy would also allow the question of European 
security to be tackled at Community level, 
E. whereas an own-initiative report is urgently required on the successes and 
shortcoming of European Political Cooperation. 
1. Calls for all the measures available under the Single European Act to be 
applied and for the present obstacles to the achievement of a unified 
foreign policy to be overcome, if necessary by modifying the Single Act. 
2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and 
Council. 
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OPINION 
of the Committee on Institutional Affairs 
Letter from the Chairman of the committee to Mr BARON CRESPO, Chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security 
Brussels, 24 September 1992 
Subject: Draft report on shaping the European Community's common foreign policy 
(rapporteur: Mr VERDE I ALDEA) - opinion of the Committee on 
Institutional Affairs 
Dear Mr Chairman, 
At its meeting of 23-24 September 1992, the Committee on Institutional Affairs 
considered the following draft opinion and adopted its conclusions 
. 1 1 unan1mous y. 
I. The Committee on Institutional Affairs mainly based its comments on the 
following documents: 
the motion for a resolution by Mr Robles Piquer, which is the basis for the 
committee's consideration of the subject (Doe. B3-0387/89/Corr.); 
the resolution of 22 November 1990 on the intergovernmental conferences as 
part of the European Parliament's strategy to achieve European Union (the 
Martin III Report, OJ No. c 324, 24.12.1990, p. 211 ff and, in particular, 
Article 130u (new); 
the resolution of 10 October 1991 on the Intergovernmental Conference on 
Political Union (OJ No. C 280, 28.10.1991, p. 148 ff.); 
the Treaty on European Union of 7 February 1992 and, in particular, 
Article J; 
the draft report by Mr Verde I Aldea of 9 June 1992 on shaping the European 
Community's common foreign policy (PE 201.471/A+B). 
The following took part in the vote: Oreja Aguirre, chairman; Prag, 
first vice-chairman; Aglietta, Blot, Bourlanges, Capucho, De Gucht, De 
Giovanni, Herman, Roenn, Roumeliotis, Valverde and von Wechmar 
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II. Title V of the Treaty on European Union, the provisions on a common foreign 
and security policy, created a new framework, superseding European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) as described in Article 30 of the Single Act. 
Whether this amounts to a step forward in substantive terms cannot be the 
subject of this opinion. 2 The Committee on Institutional Affairs is more 
concerned to assess the achievements of the Treaty of Maastricht in the 
light of the EP's institutional demands and- pursuant to the duty imposed 
on it by the resolution of 7 April 1992 on the findings of the 
intergovernmental conferences - 'make maximum use of the instruments at its 
disposal under the Maastricht Treaty'. To achieve this, the Committee on 
Institutional Affairs deems it appropriate for the EP to consider Mr Verde 
I Aldea' s report at the October 1992 part-session, as planned by the 
committee responsible. In this way, Parliament can decide how it intends 
to take advantage of the provisions set out in Articles J to J11 of the 
Treaty. The decisions thus taken must then be taken into account in the 
review of the Rules of Procedure scheduled for November. 
III. Title V of the Treaty of Maastricht has a number of virtues but also a 
number of weaknesses. Its main virtue is probably outside Title V itself, 
in Article C of Title I (Common Provisions), which lays down that the Union 
shall have a single institutional framework. The same Council, in 
conjunction with the Commission, is to be responsible for safeguarding the 
consistency and continuity of activities in the context of external 
relations, security, and economic and development policies. There is still 
no single institutional framework; nor is the necessary consistency of 
foreign and security policy with other Community policies assured. It is 
for the European Parliament to insist that these commitments are respected. 
2 
Article c also contains a statement that should be of significance in 
connection with Article J: it speaks of 'respecting and building upon 
the acquis communautaire'. After Maastricht, according to Article J3 
this acquis includes a decision-making apparatus for joint action, that 
is fundamentally based on unanimity in the Council (the procedure of 
joint action does not apply to defence matters). True, pursuant to 
Article J3 II the Council does decide over issues in which a decision 
must be taken with a qualified majority. But experience of Article 130s 
of the EEC Treaty as currently framed gives no grounds for hope that 
this option will be frequently employed, even in important matters. Nor 
does the 27th declaration attached to the Treaty on voting in the field 
of the common foreign and security policy offer any guarantee that the 
qualified majority, which alone might be capable of ensuring the 
necessary efficiency of the decision-making procedure, will be used 
effectively. The compromise reached by the Intergovernmental Conference 
emphasizes as a matter of principle the need for unanimity. In doing 
so, the conference selected the least efficient of the options 
discussed, though it was the one that was most popular with the 
governments of the Member States. 
See, for example, Elfriede Regelsberger, Die Gemeinsame AuBen-und 
Sicherhei tspoli tik nach Maastricht Minimalreformen in neuer 
Entwicklungsperspektive, Integration 2/92, p. 83 ff 
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Given this starting point, it will be the task of the EP and, in 
particular, the EP committee responsible to insist that maximum use is 
made of the qualified majority. 
'Building upon the acquis communautaire', as stipulated in Article C, 
can only mean from the point of view of the EP - as proposed in its 
resolution of 22 November 1990 - that decisions in the field of foreign 
policy will be taken in the Council pursuant to the second indent of 
Article 148(2) of the Treaty and a precisely defined opting-out 
procedure by the same majority must be approved. This is the only 
procedure that can ensure the necessary efficiency of decision-making 
and, where appropriate, permit necessary exemptions for individual (for 
example, 'neutral') Member States. 
In view of the forthcoming enlargements of the Community/Union, this 
issue is of particular relevance. Of the seven countries that have 
currently lodged applications for membership, five have neutral, albeit 
differing status. If the unanimity rule in the Council were retained, 
decision-making could well prove difficult after enlargement, to a great 
extent preventing the Union from pursuing an effective foreign policy. 
Statements by the Austrian, Swedish1 and Swiss2 Governments indicate 
that problems shaping foreign policy due to participation of these 
countries should not be expected, which in plain English may mean an 
embargo on the unanimity required. Only the model proposed by the EP 
could avoid embargoes of this kind. Article C allows the Union to 
insist on a solution of this type in negotiations on accession. With 
regard to the Union's internal development Article 0 - in addition to 
Article C - enables institutional development of this kind to take place 
by addressing the 'adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is 
founded which such admission entails'. As the EP's assent to 
enlargements is required, it possesses the necessary means of giving 
force to its demands. This is the background to the call made in 
paragraph 16(g) of the resolution of 7 April 1992 'to address many of 
the problems before the Intergovernmental Conference scheduled for 
1996'. In fact, the conference would be too late, bearing in mind the 
anticipated timescale for the first enlargements. Any review in 1996 
pursuant to Article J 10 in conjunction with J 4 and 6 will clearly 
involve the prospect of extensive amendments. 
IV. The greatest weakness of Title V was singled out in paragraph 2(a) of the 
above resolution of 7 April 1992: the 'pillar' structure that ' leaves the 
common foreign and security policy outside the European Community Treaty 
(with, therefore, a lesser role for the Commission and for Parliament and 
no possibility of appealing to the Court of Justice) and will confuse the 
rest of the world, with the "Union" (represented by the Presidency of the 
Council) acting in some areas and the "Community" (represented by the 
Commission) acting in others'. 
2 
Interview with Anders Bjork, Swedish Defence Minister, Liberation, 30 
June 1992, p. 13 
Report on Swiss accession to the European Community, Rome, 20 May 1992 
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This structural inadequacy acquires fresh importance from the discussion 
about the association of third countries to the intergovernmental 
pillars (and the debate sparked off by the Danish referendum). The 
Committee on Institutional Affairs has already insisted in paragraph 6 
of the motion for a resolution in the Hansch Report (Doe. A3-0189/92) 
that these - desirable -associations must come about 'without, however, 
preventing the development towards genuine, full-blown Community powers 
in those sectors'. In fact, full-blown Community powers remain the 
principal objective. The Committee on Institutional Affairs considers 
that, in its resolution of 22 November 1990 and particularly in Article 
130u of the EEC Treaty, the EP has provided an operational model. 
v. Article J 7 describes the role assigned by the Treaty of Maastricht to the 
EP in the field of foreign and security policy. This description must be 
interpreted in such a way that it approaches as closely as possible the 
EP's call in its resolution of 10 October 1991, which states that the 
European Parliament 'shall be associated with the formulation of foreign 
policy and shall monitor its implementation'. To this end, the EP calls 
on the European Council to 'define the essential common interests which 
shall be submitted to the European Parliament for approval'. 
Under Article D of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Council is to 
report regularly to the European Parliament. Should any of these 
reports fail to be sufficiently prompt or precise, the EP must at all 
times be in a position to respond on its own initiative. For this 
reason, continuous moni taring of foreign policy by the committee 
responsible is necessary. For this reason, the current presidency has 
declared its willingness to notify the committee at every meeting of the 
current state of affairs. This is part of the institutional acquis, 
which from the EP's vantage point was supposed to be promoted through 
changes to the Rules of Procedure. In future every committee meeting 
will - if necessary - be a colloquy in the sense of Rule 57 of the Rules 
of Procedure. Or - to put it another way - there will no longer be any 
specific quarterly colloquies. Consideration might also be given to 
enabling committee meetings to receive and discuss confidential 
information more easily than before. 
The European Parliament - and that means every MEP - can also use 
questions to exercise Parliament's monitoring and initiative functions. 
In future these will all be addressed to the Commission or Council and 
no longer to EPC. 
The European Parliament has been granted a special instrument in the 
form of 'recommendations' to the Council. The European Parliament has 
no right to propose legislation in the field of foreign and security 
policy, though it can seek the cooperation of the Commission, which is 
dependent on it. But it can employ recommendations in such a manner as 
to given them considerable political weight. This entails making 
sparing use of this instrument and an efficient internal filter when 
recommendations are drawn up in order to fully exploit its special 
political status and importance. One might consider reserving draft 
resolutions containing recommendations for the committee responsible. 
This would avoid every resolution adopted under the urgent procedure 
being elevated to this rank, thus devaluing the recommendation as a 
weapon. 
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.. 
VI. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Conclusions 
The Committee on Institutional Affairs calls on the committee 
responsible to take the following points into account in its motion for 
a resolution in the report on shaping the European Community's Common 
Foreign Policy (the Verde I Aldea report): 
Where Article C of the Maastricht Treaty talks about 'building upon the 
acquis communautaire', care must also be taken to ensure that decisions in 
the field of foreign policy are taken in the Council pursuant to Article 
148(2), second indent, of the EEC Treaty and to approve, where necessary, 
a carefully specified opting-out procedure by the same majority. 
So long as the treaty position remains the same, the EP will ensure that 
the Council takes advantage of its powers to take decisions by a qualified 
majority in order to make the Union capable of action. 
The proposed enlargements of the Union should not permit political issues 
to be decided by the use of interinstitutional mechanisms (unanimity). The 
mechanism in question must therefore be corrected by the time the first 
enlargement takes place, at the latest. 
4. Granting full-blown Community powers to the pillar of common foreign and 
security policy remains the prime objective of the European Parliament, 
which put forward the relevant proposals in its resolution of 22 November 
1990. 
5. The European Parliament insists on permanent and intensive information from 
the Council and Commission. It shall exercise its rights of control above 
all through questions, debates, resolutions and through its budgetary 
powers. Through its recommendations, it will play its part in shaping the 
European Community's common foreign policy. 
Yours faithfully, 
(sgd) Marcelino Oreja Aguirre 
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